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SELLER'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR
HIS GOODS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE*
GERALD L. KOCK**
Under the Uniform Commercial Code the term "contract for
sale" includes both present sales and contracts to sell in the future.
A sale, the hoped for result of it all, consists in passing title from
the seller to the buyer for a price.' The parties, it will be noticed,
are seller and buyer. In using the Code it is helpful to keep the
Code's distinction between buyer and purchaser in mind. A buyer
is one who buys or contracts to buy goods. 2 A purchaser, on
the other hand, may take by sale,3 discount, negotiation, mort-
gage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary
transaction creating an interest in property. 4
The general obligations resting on the parties to a sale transac-
tion are simply stated. 5 The obligation of the seller is to transfer
and deliver the goods. The obligation of the buyer is to accept and
pay for them. What it is that the seller has an obligation to transfer
and deliver is essentially a question of the bargain between the
parties. What goods were the subject matter of the sale? Was any
burden assumed with reference to their usefulness by the seller?
These are the questions of warranty. The warranty provisions of
the Code are in a small block of sections covering warranty of title
and against infringement, 6 express warranty,7 implied warranty
of merchantability8 and implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.9 These sections are followed by rules regulating dis-
claimers of warranty liability, 10 limitations upon remedies in the
event of breach," rules for interpretation of warranty terms in
sale contracts,'12 and a limitation on the operation of the general rule
requiring privity of contract when recovery is based on warranty. 3
*Much of the material in this article Is drawn from KOCK, GEORGIA COMMERCIAL
PRAcTICE. It is hoped that it will ultimately become part of a chapter in a brief manual
of commercial law.
**Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A., 1955, 1956, J.D., 1958, Uni-
varsity of Chicago; LL.M., 1961, New York University; Member of the Illinois Bar.
'1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(1); All footnotes herein refer to sections of
the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE unless otherwise indicated.
2. § 2-103(1) (a).
3. I.e., a buyer.
4. §§ 1-201(33), 1-201(32).
5. § 2-301.
6. § 2-312.
7. t 2-313.
8. § 2-314.
9. § 2-315.
10. § 2-316.
11. §§ 2-316(4), 2-319.
12. § 2-317.
13. § 2-318.
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If the words and conduct of the parties in the course of concluding
their deal were such as would create warranties under several sec-
tions of the Code, it will sometimes be necessary to sort them out
in order to determine what the deal was from the point of view
of warranty protection. Clearly, if the resulting warranties are en-
tirely consistent with each other they should all be effective and
enforced." It is entirely possible, however, that warranties that
are created on one analysis of the facts may be inconsistent with
warranties resulting from another analysis of the same transaction.
In analyzing any transaction close attention must be paid to the
language used by the parties. In a number of cases that can easily
be identified the particularity with which some characteristic of the
goods is prescribed will foreclose other claimed characteristics. A
junk dealer, for example, is probably selling goods that in another
context are likely to be unmerchantable. To help in dealing with
these situations the Code gives us three common sense rules for
interpreting warranties. Technical language displaces general lan-
guage.'5 A sample, a detailed form of description, displaces general
language.' 8 And express warranties displace inconsistent implied
warranties. 1 7 A caveat must be noted here. An implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose, since it is not in fact a warranty
of quality, is never displaced by a warranty of quality. Also, since
the foundations on which that warranty rests do not relate to the
goods at all-reliance being the test, and usefulness being the
warranty-no warranty respecting the goods goes to negative or
disclaim the particular purpose warranty. As we will see below,
express warranty may be a factor, however, since there is always
a question of whether or not there was reliance.
EXPRESS WARRANTY
The creation, exclusion and modification of warranties are all
the product of the language, conduct and circumstances involved
in the bargaining and conclusion of the sale. In any case of claimed
warranty one must check the statute for two steps in the dealings
of the parties. The first step is to see if warranty could have
been created on the facts one has. Then attention must be directed
to the question whether any potential warranties have been excluded
or limited in their operation. If the problem is one involving express
warranty and there are writings evidencing all or part of the deal
arrived at by the parties, the parol evidence rule will be a factor
limiting provable words and conduct.18 Subject to that limitation
14. § 2-317.
15. § 2-317(a).
16. § 2-317(b).
17. § 2-317(c.
18. See § 2-2"2.
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on the words and conduct on which one may rely in building or
defending a case, attention must be given to words and conduct
of the parties and any appropriate course of dealing or trade usage.
If words and conduct are found that tend both to create and to
negative express warranty, the first inquiry is whether there is any
reasonable interpretation that would leave it all operative as con-
sistent. Language and conduct tending to limit or exclude express
warranty is operative only if it cannot be read as consistent with
any express warranties that might be created by the same or other
words or conduct of the parties in concluding their deal.19 Words
and conduct creating express warranty are generally a matter of
specifying the goods that are the subject matter of the contract.2 0
It is not limited to that, of course. A number of modern contract
forms are drafted to contain an express warranty of merchantability.
Such terms are affirmations of fact or promises relating to the
goods and, like any other such affirmations and promises, to the
extent they are part of the basis of the bargain they create express
warranty.2 1 Modern printed forms do often use the word "warranty"
or "warrant," but that is not necessary to the creation of express
warranty. It is not necessary either that there be any particular
intent to make a warranty, so long as the language forms a part of
the basis of the bargain. 22 The Code's "basis of the bargain" is
essentially the same as "if the natural tendency . . . is to induce
the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the
goods relying thereon.1 23 It is neater, and it should be easier to
work with.
Whether the seller's praise of his goods is warranty or not
depends on the same question. Was it a part of the basis of the
bargain or was it properly only "puffing," taken only to be an
opinion as to value or mere commendation of the goods? The answer
to this question may very well depend as much on the status and
understanding of the buyer as on the subjective intent of the seller.
A description of the goods certainly creates an express warranty.
The goods sold must be the goods dealt for.2 4 Though the description
of the goods has to be an express term of the contract if the parties
expect to consummate a sale, the Sales Act characterized this as
an implied warranty. 25 This is consistent with the wide-open treat-
ment of warranty one finds elsewhere in that act,26 but it complicates
matters when the seller's contract is under consideration. The single
19. § 2-316(1).
20. § 2-313.
21. § 2-313(1) (a).
22. § 2-313(2).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-13 (1960).
24. § 2-313(1)(b).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-15 (1960).
26. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-12(1) (1960).
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question, "Does the seller have to deliver exactly what he sold?"
requires taking account of promises and affirmations, '2 7 warranty
of description, 28 and warranty of bulk, 2 and there is a section of
the statute dealing with other matters standing between each of
the three. They have been combined under the Uniform Commercial
Code.80
A sample or model, if it is the basis of the bargain, is description.
It is sometimes the only description there is; sometimes it is ac-
companied by descriptive words. But, whether a sample or model
is in fact a basis of the bargain or not raises a problem. When a
sample or model is used it is sometimes troublesome to determine
whether it was merely to suggest some characteristics, to give
an idea, as it were, of structure or quality or whether it was to
be the description. Ordinarily if there is no limiting factor a sample
or model will probably, in a commercial situation, be the description,
with such things as sizes and colors specified in addition, in some
cases. The question is the same as in other express warranty
problems: was it part of the basis of the bargain?-1
The most satisfactory way for a seller to be sure he does not
make express warranties he does not want is to take care not to
say or demonstrate things he is not willing to live up to. Though
it is true that disclaimers and limitations are possible, the problem
here is that it is the basis of the bargain that is involved. It is not
at all unlikely that the anticipated disclaimer or limitation was an
important factor in pricing. The trouble comes from the fact that
since description goes to the essence of the contract, proof that the
description was not warranted tends to show that the parties did
not conclude a contract at all. When one argues "I sold a '59 Chevy,
but I did not sell an automotive vehicle," he gets awfully close to
saying "I didn't sell anything." The neatest solution to this problem
does not really help when the warranty goes to description; but
take for example new automobile contracts. The approach there
is to make an express warranty of merchantability and then to
limit liability for breach.2 A contract provision for liquidated
damages is workable, so long as it does not become penal in its
operation, 33 but the most useful device in warranty cases is to
maintain control over remedies generally. The replacement parts
"warranty" is within this category. It is not warranty; it is limitation
of liability for breach of warranty-serving also to fix a standard
of merchantability when it runs in terms of a period of time or
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-13 (1960).
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-15 (1960).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-17 (1960).
30. § 2-313.
31. § 2-313(1)(c).
32. § 2-316(4).
33. § 2-718(1).
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stated mileage. 8' If one is using such a limitation provision, care
must be taken to make it expressly understood that the substitute
remedy is exclusive. If that is not done the effect is to give the
buyer an optional added remedy, and the advantage of the term
as a limiting factor disappears.3 5
Such a limitation clause is not always effective, however. If
the circumstances are such as to cause the limitation to fail of its
purpose, the normal remedies are reverted to.38 Take, for example,
the replacement parts provision. This is clearly a provision for the
orderly handling of claims arising from mechanical breakdown-and
is directed to the kinds of damages that might grow out of the
buyer's scrounging around for parts and installation service. Should
the mechanical failure occur under such circumstances that sub-
stantial property damage is caused, the limitation provision fails
of its purpose. Such a clause cannot be used to limit liability for
injuries to the person by consumer goods. 3 7
WARRANTIES IMPLIED FROM THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION
The two basic implied warranties that arise from a sale simply
because there has been a sale have been among the most trouble-
some areas of sales law. The difficulty involved in making them
function satisfactorily led the Code drafters to separate them so
that their separate functions might better be served. The unneces-
sary limitation of the warranty of merchantable quality to sales by
description3 8 has led courts to treat as problems of fitness for a
particular purpose fact situations that called only for a warranty
of merchantability. The consumer goods cases are the most obvious
example of this. Because it is usually impossible to find a sale by
description, as is required by the Sales Act,39 there can be no
regular warranty of merchantability. In order to arrive at a proper
result on the facts courts have simply ignored the well established
distinction between fitness for a particular purpose4 0 and fitness
for ordinary purposes (merchantability) and have granted relief on
the basis of what should have been an expert's warranty, more-
or-less.41
Under the Code the question is, as it ought always to have been,
merchantability, not fitness for any particular purpose. Every sale
of goods by a merchant gives rise to an implied warranty that the
goods are fit to sell, that is, that they are merchantable. This
34. § 2-719(1) (a).
35. § 2-719(1)(b).
36. § 2-719(2).
37. § 2-719(3).38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-16 (1960). The statement in the statute of the warranty
obligation as a mere exception to a general rule of no liability has not helped much either.
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-16(2) (1960).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-16(1) (1960).
41. See the discussion at page 31 and following.
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includes every sale, including the serving of food and drink for
value. 2
Express warranties can displace implied warranties,43 but the
usual function of the express warranties is other than that. In
order to know the measure of merchantability one must know what
was sold; that depends on the express warranties. As a result,
express warranty is usually the place from which we must work
when we undertake to determine the scope of the warranty of
merchantability. The Code drafters have given us some help in
working with questions of merchantability by giving us a list of
standards against which the goods are to be measured. 4  The list
is not exclusive, 45 but it is quite comprehensive, including minimal
standards for many different kinds of goods. The goods supplied
must be such as pass without objection in the trade under the
contract description. 46  This test clearly demonstrates the close
relation of express and implied warranties. The goods must conform
to any description that has been the basis of the bargain.4 7 If there
is a breach of that express warranty, the goods will surely not be
such as would pass in the trade under that description.
If the goods are fungible, they must be of fair, average quality
within the description. 48 Goods must be fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used. 49 Here it must be emphasized that
it is fitness of the goods that is involved. The cases involving buyers
who become ill because of some special sensitivity are another
matter altogether. The law regulates defective goods, not defective
buyers. The goods must conform to affirmations made on the
container or label, if any.51 If the agreement required them to be
packaged or labeled that must be adequately done.52 and they must
be of even quality within each unit and among all units, within
variations allowed by the agreement. 53
The close connection between the warranty of merchantability
and express warranties is especially important when we look at
sales made by sellers who are not "merchants. ' ' 54 The statutory
42. § 2-314(1).
43. § 2-317(c).
44. § 2-314(2).
45. " Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as ... " § 2-314(2) "Unless
excluded or modified . . . other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing
or usage of trade." § 2-314(3).
46. § 2-314(2)(a).
47. § 2-313(1)(b).
48. § 2-314(2)(b).
49. § 2-314(2)(c).
50. Reference omitted intentionally, Editor.
51. § 2-314(2)(f).
52. § 2-314(2) (e).
53. § 2-314(2)(d).
54. A merchant is one who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or who deals through another who has such knowledge or skill.
See § 2-104(1).
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warranty of merchantability is a merchant's warranty. It has an
impact on non-merchant sellers, however, because its function is
largely to supply a measure of conformance to description. When a
non-merchant sells, he is bound by his express warranties. The
question whether the goods he has supplies conform to the standard
will be a question whether they are salable under that description;
this is a form of merchantability, though the question remains one
of express warranty.
MERCHANTABILITY-LIMITATION AND EXCLUSION
The circumstances of commercial dealing may very well be
such that no warranty of merchantability arises. It can be excluded
by prior dealings between the parties or performance under the
agreement in issue or by trade usage. 55 Another form of what
amounts to the same rule is found in the use of certain words of
art that serve to call to the buyer's attention that no warranties
are being made by the seller. 51 The efficacy of any particular
words depends entirely upon the circumstances. In some trades
one form of words will be sufficient to convey that message while
in other lines of business different language may be called for. The
examples given in the Code are "as is" and "with all faults."
These are probably the most commonly used expressions for this
purpose, but even they cannot be expected to convey the intended
message under all circumstances. What is operating here is a
shorthand form of expression, not magic.
Merchantability always depends upon the underlying contract.
If before concluding the sale the buyer has in fact examined the
goods as fully as he desired, there is no warranty as to any defects
that his examination ought under the circumstances to have revealed.
It must be noted here that normally the implied warranties do
protect against patent defects. If the buyer does examine the goods
before entering into the contract that protection is not available;
he has chosen to rely on his own examination. This reliance upon
the buyer's examination may be taken advantage of by the seller
also. He may include in his part of the deal a requirement that
the buyer examine the goods. If he does that and the buyer none-
the-less refuses to examine them, there is no implied warranty with
regard to defects that the buyer would have discovered if he had
examined them. 7 Whether buyer must examine the goods or not
depends on what seller was bargaining for. The defects that
examination ought to disclose will depend on the buyer's capacity.
An expert will be bound by what an expert would have noticed;
55. § 2-316(3)(c).
56. § 2-316(3)(a).
57. § 2-316(3)(b).
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an unskilled layman is held only to what one not a specialist in
such goods would notice.
The result in a particular case can still depend on whether
the defect was a patent one. In case of breach of warranty the
buyer must notify his seller of the claim of breach or lose his
remedy. This notice must be given within a reasonable time after
the buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach. 58 It is
at this point that the fact that it was a patent defect is important.
When the parties bargain with respect to goods they can, of
course, bargain with regard to exclusion of the warranty of mer-
chantability. If that is done, and words of art as discussed above59
are not used, there must be explicit mention of merchantability.6 0
This is simply a matter of preventing surprise-the disclaimer
that slips in on an unwary buyer. For the same reason, the Code
recognizes the dangers inherent in the printed forms that we see get
longer every year. Too often have we seen disclaimers in small
print somewhere down in the middle of a page. The Code rule
cannot hurt honest merchants and can protect at least some buyers.
If the exclusionary clause is in writing, the required mention of
merchantability must be so written that a reasonable person ought
to have noticed it, it must be conspicuous.61 The safest way to
insure that this standard is met is to print it substantially larger
than the surrounding provisions or to print it in a contrasting color. 62
FITNESS AND PARTICULAR PURPOSE
This, too, is a warranty arising from the nature of the transaction
but it is different from merchantability 63 just as it is different
from express warranty. Fitness for a particular purpose goes beyond
the goods themselves; it relates to an undertaking by the seller in
terms of the usefulness of the goods. Whether the goods are as
described or not is one question; whether they are merchantable
under the contract description is another; whether they will be
useful to accomplish the buyer's needs is another matter altogether.
This third warranty is not a product of every sale. As things go it
is quite rare, but when the facts of the bargaining meet the criteria
established for it, it is a very important matter. The facts from
which this warranty builds run in terms of the buyer who comes
into the store and says "I want a widget that will do thus and so."
Seller picks out one that he believes will serve the purpose and
sells it. Seller when he does this had better be right about its
58. § 2-607(3) (a).
59. Supra note 56.
60. § 2-316(2).
61. Ibid.
62. § 1-201(10).
63. Fitness for ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. § 2-314(2)(c).
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usefulness. This is not a matter of being helpful to customers.
Buyer has indicated his reliance on seller to know his widgets and
the seller in order to make the sale has undertaken to ensure that a
stated need is met. It is not necessary that seller utter words of
promise, and he need not have any intent to warrant. All that is
needed to create this additional liability is that seller know of any
particular purpose for which buyer wants the goods and that the
buyer be relying on him to exercise his skill or judgment.6 4 It does
not matter that the seller has no particular skill; he is bound if
he exercises his judgment and completes the sale.
The skill or judgment factor is an important safeguard for a
seller. He cannot be bound by a warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose unless he is left free to exercise his own judgment, 5 using
whatever skill he may have. If the buyer makes his purpose known
and limits the seller's freedom of action by prescribing severely
limiting requirements, it can hardly be said that he is relying on
the seller's skill or judgment. Even if the goods are sold by
description, trade name, or other specifications, there is a warranty
of fitness if the seller had reason to know the particular purpose
for which the buyer wanted the goods and that the buyer was relying
on him to supply appropriate goods. 66 It does not matter that the
seller has no particular skill if there is reason to know of the
buyer's reliance. In order to make his showing of the seller's reason
to know, the buyer can show prior dealings between the same
parties. Any course of prior dealings between these parties may
be used to explain or supplement the express terms of an agree-
ment,67 if they can reasonably be construed as consistent with the
express terms.68 Of course, if there have been repeated deliveries
of similar goods by the seller and the buyer has been using them,
the buyer's failure to complain earlier is relevant to the question
of what the contract called for.69 If the buyer has repeatedly
accepted performances inconsistent with his present claim of high
quality the course of performance will prevail over course of dealing,
as it would prevail over trade usage.7 0
The effect of an express warranty, description, for example,
is to fix the basic standard of merchantability. Its effect on the
warranty of fitness is different. In that case it depends entirely on
who fixes the description and, if the buyer does so, whether there
64. § 2-315.
65. It is on this point that the rule of N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-01-16(4) (1960) is
significant, but it is not conclusive under the Code, as it was under the Sales Act.
66. § 2-315.
67. § 1-205(3).
68. § 1-205(4).
69. § 2-208(1).
70. § 2-208(2).
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has been any reliance by the buyer on seller's skill or judgment
to furnish suitable goods.7 1
FITNESS-LIMITATION AND EXCLUSION
A very common problem that buyers have run into when they
have tried to recover on the basis of this warranty in the past has
grown out of this kind of situation. Buyer goes to seller and says
he wants a widget to do a certain job. Seller picks out one and
fills out a sales contract form, filling in the description of the widget
he has selected. Buyer signs the form. When the breach of warranty
claim arises, seller has two dodges: (1) buyer can't prove his war-
ranty because of the parol evidence rule; (2) even if he could,
express warranty displaces implied warranty.7 2 Both of these
arguments are specious. If the warranty of fitness arises from the
facts of the parties' dealing, the signed order form does not constitute
the agreement between the parties. The second point is bad because
the whole thrust of the warranty is that seller had control over
the description that would be used in the writing. In such a case
it would be absurd for the express warranty to displace the implied
warranty; on the facts it could not be an inconsistent term .7 3 If
the circumstances of the contracting were such as to create the
warranty, no writing that does not include or specifically disclaim
it can be a complete statement of the terms, and evidence of all
the facts is necessarily evidence of consistent additional terms.7 4
If the seller wants to disclaim this warranty he must do so in
writing, and the disclaimer must, for the reasons indicated above,
be conspicuous. 75 No particular words need be used, however. The
words THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES WHICH EXTEND BEYOND
THE DESCRIPTION ON THE FACE HEREOF76 would be a
sufficient disclaimer of the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, and a full general disclaimer of all implied warranties
could be as simple as THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES OF MER-
CHANTABILITY OR FITNESS EXCEPT AS EXPRESSED HEREIN.
Another side of the parol evidence rule frequently comes up in
warranty cases. These are the cases in which the buyer concludes
a contract that contains an adequate disclaimer. Thereafter, he
discovers that the machine is not capable of doing the job. He
complains to the seller, who makes some adjustments and assures
the buyer that the machine will do the job. Assuming the disclaimer
to have been effective, what is the buyer's position? Parol evidence
71. § 2-315.
72. Of course, the sound rule is that express warranty displaces only inconsistent
implied warranties.
73. § 2-3174c).
74. See § 2-202.
75. Supra note 61.
76. § 2-316(2).
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may not be used to contradict any writing intended by the parties
to have been a final expression of the terms it includes. 77 This is
true whether or not the writing was intended to have been a complete
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. As a result,
the buyer will not be able to prove a prior or contemporaneous
agreement amounting to a warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, but there remains the question of the subsequent assurances.
An agreement may contain a provision that would prevent a parol
modification, but if there is no such provision, separately signed by
the buyer in the case of a printed form, 78 the subsequent assurance
that the equipment would do the job the buyer wanted it for amounts
to a promise or affirmation of fact creating express warranty. 79
This cannot be an implied warranty of fitness, because that depends
on reliance at the time of the original sale, 0 but it can be an express
warranty added to the contract without additional consideration. 81
THE LIMITS OF WARRANTY-TORT AND PRIVITY
This is not an appropriate place for a survey of either the
history of contract law or new developments in the law of torts,
but if the relation of the Commercial Code to what it has become
fashionable to call "products liability" is to be understood it is
necessary to turn briefly to both of these fascinating areas. The
confusion that appears in products liability cases may be an aid
to the more rapid development of tort law, but there is a danger
that our contract law, especially as that is embodied in the
Commercial Code, will be burdened with qualifications and limi-
tations not appropriate in the context of sales transactions.
Much of the confusion is attributable to frequent repetition of
an historical truth that misleads because it mistakes one element
for the whole set. It has been over-emphasized that warranty
has its source in tort.8 2 Warranty did have its beginnings in
tort. The untruth arises from the failure to note that, except for
the actions of debt, detinue, covenant and account, all of modern
contract law had its origins in tort. All of it is, in fact, development
from trespass. 83 The actions upon a special case in assumpsit or
indebitatus assumpsit are our modern contract law. Building from
an action upon a special case for deceit, one had to show the
undertaking, assumpsit, and a breach to show the deceit. The
77. § 2-202.
78. § 2-209(2).
79. § 2-313(1) (a).
80. § 2-315.
81. § 2-209(1).
82. For a very recent example of such talk in what was a relatively clear sales case,
see Hanson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, 276 F.2d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 1960).
83. Modem historians appear to accept that this was a shift of jurisdiction from the
local courts to the royal courts rather than a development of new law; but, for all of
that, see the discussion in MAITLAND, FORMS OF AcTIoN AT COMMON LAw, Lecture VI
(1962).
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assumpsit, being the source of the duty of the defendant toward
the plaintiff, became more important an element than the deceit,
which disappeared except as a formal averment. The step from
nonfeasance to misfeasance involves more history than is needed
here, but it is clear that once a defective performance can be found
to support a recovery, little further development is needed before it
becomes as much of a breach to supply a sick cow as to supply one
larger, smaller, or of another breed than contracted for. Subject to
varying rules over the years about the buyer's need to trust his own
senses, this is essentially warranty as we know it in sales contracts. 4
The remainder of the development, that sounding in tort even
today, can be seen to have much of the same coloration in its
early years. The so-called "dangerous instrumentality" cases",
developed beginning in the early 19th Century. Some of them
sounded in negligence, but others of them did not. The courts
found representations by a seller upon which to base liability even
toward parties with whom they had not dealt. "The warranty
between these parties has not the effect of a contract; it is no
more than a representation; but it is no less."8 6 There we have
roots from which strict liability could grow without regard to
privity of contract. Put this with trespass upon a special case in
negligence, which dates back to the time of the action on the case
in assumpsit, and the basis of modern tort law, as far as "products
liability" is concerned, can be developed. Even given these
foundations, however, the notion that there must be some direct
connection between the parties if there is to be a duty, the breach
of which will support damages, has persisted in the law. Over
the years there were a number of cases in which liability was
found; these were usually turned on some peculiar attribute of the
commodity that caused the harm, as a substitute for a direct
relation between the parties: privity. On the negligence side it
came to be said that "if the nature of the thing is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril, when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger. '" 8 7 And, if it is a thing of
danger, there is liability. On the representation, or warranty, side
of this coin we have among the recent cases the statement that
"Surely under modern merchandising practices the manufacturer
owes a very real obligation toward those who consume or use his
products. The warranties made by the manufacturer in his adver-
tisements and by the labels on his products are inducements to
84. The enforcement of parol contracts, of course, gives rise to problems of finding
terms that are not spoken out Why this examination of circumstances evidencing terms
of implied contracts should have given rise to suggestions that caveat emptor is by no
means clear.85. The basic core of these cases is interestingly discussed'in Lxvi, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL REASONING 6-19 (1955).
86. Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519 (1837), 150 Eng. Rep. 863, 868.87. MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
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the ultimate consumers, and the manufacturer ought to be held
to strict accountability to any consumer who buys the product in
reliance on such representations and later suffers injury because
the product proves to be defective or deleterious. ' 8
The Commercial Code has no direct impact on either of these
developments. Article 2 of the Code deals with the law of sales,
and it covers the warranty liability that exists between parties to
sales contracts-that is, their contract liability. The Code does not
deal with negligence, and its warranty sections do not impinge
upon the "lines of case law growth which have recognized that
warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the
direct parties to such a contract. ' 8 9 The greatest impact of the
Code on tort law will probably prove to be in the determination
of whether there was any representation-warranty-in the first
place. Though there is no necessity to refer this question to the
Code, as a body of law that is specially directed to just that
question in the context of contract law, it is the logical place to
turn for a test when one is needed in a tort case.
There is one point at which the Code does change the privity
requirement directly. A seller's warranties, whether express or
implied, protect any natural person in the family or household of
the buyer, and even guests of the buyer, if it is reasonable to
expect that these persons may use, consume or be affected by
the goods. 90 This extension of protection cannot be limited by
agreement, though, of course, the warranty itself may be excluded
or modified. The only effect of this rule is to extend the coverage
of any warranties that may exist; it does not create any new
warranty. 91 The question of what warranties there may be depends
upon the contract of the buyer and seller, not this section of
the Code.
REMEDIES-THE DAMAGES PROBLEM
If the goods that are supplied by the seller do not conform to
the contract, the buyer may reject them,9 2 and in some cases an
acceptance may be revoked, 93 with the same result as a rejection.9 4
In the normal breach of warranty situation, however, once the goods
are accepted an obligation to pay the price arises.95 If the price
has not yet been paid, the buyer may, after giving notice of an
88. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1958).
89. § 2-313, comment 2.
90. § 2-318.
91. Though this section was drafted to deal with the problem caused by family and
servant cases in the context of a sale to the head of the household, Wyoming has
adopted it in a changed version that reaches far into tort law.
92. § 2-601.
93. § 2-608 (1) (b).
94. § 2-608(3).
95. § 2-607(1).
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intention to do so, set off against the price his claimed damages1 s
In the normal case, he would have an action for damages.97
In a number of jurisdictions complications involving rescission
and failure of consideration and an inappropriate application of
the foreseeability rule laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale98 have
led counsel to advise an action in tort rather than in contract
when the buyer suffered substantial consequential damages. The
Code rule on consequential damages is more specific than was the
prior law, and it should be easier for the courts to work with.
In the normal commercial situation the damage rule is uncom-
plicated. The measure of damages is the difference between the
value of the goods at the time and place of acceptance and the
value they would have if they had been as warranted. If different
proximate damages can be shown they can be recovered.99
Incidental damages that result from the seller's breach may be
recovered also, of course. 00 In many cases, however, the consequen-
tial damages are the most important part of the recovery needed
to compensate for the harm caused by the breach. These too can
be recovered. 10 The measure of the consequential damages that
can be recovered depends on the kind of injury claimed for. If
there has been injury to person or property, any damages proxi-
mately resulting from the breach may be recovered. 0 2 If the
harm is not to person or property, consequential damages are lim-
ited to those arising from facts that the seller had reason to
know and that the buyer could not reasonably prevent. 0 3 The
maximum recovery then includes any direct proximate damages,
plus incidental damages, plus consequential damages foreseeable
by the seller, plus any damage to person or property proximately
resulting from the breach.
The parties may, of course, contract for a modification of the
statutory remedies. They may provide for liquidated damages 04
or limitation or modification of remedies 0 5 so long as the limits
that are fixed are not unconscionable,' 0 6 but if the limitation fails
of its purpose it is not effective. 0 7 The replacement parts "war-
ranty" that is common in motor vehicle contracts is a common
example of such limitation clause, 0 8 but no limitation provision
96. § 2-717.
97, § 2-714(1).
98. [1954] 3 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
99. § 2-714(2).
100. II 2-714(3), 2-715(1).
101. § 2-714(3).
102. § 2-715(2)(b).
103. § 2-715(2)(a).
104. § 2-718(1).
105. § 2-719(1).
106. § 2-719(3). The court's Power to refuse to enforce contract clauses that were
unconscionable when the contract was made is in § 2-302.
107. § 2-719(2).
108. See, e.g., § 2-719(1)(a).
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may cut off consequential damages for personal injuries caused
by consumer goods.10 9
The seller who is liable in warranty under a sales contract
has his action over for breach of the same warranty against his
seller. This is so, at least, if he has not purchased under such
conditions that a lower standard of goods would be merchantable
as to him, and if he has not permitted his seller to exclude or
modify his liability. When the retail seller is sued, he may vouch
in his seller"10 or wait and sue later. His recovery against his
seller would be any loss resulting from the requirements that the
goods be fit for resale."' 1 The seller who sells to retailers has
abundant reason to know of that requirement, and should the goods
not be merchantable the dealer/buyer may recover from his seller
any damages that may have been recovered from him.
TITLE
A sale is seen technically as consisting in the passing of title
from seller to buyer for a price. 11 This being so, it is to be expected
that the seller must be held to warrant title. Under the Commercial
Code, the warranty of title is not considered either express or
implied. It is sui generis and has its separate rules for creation,
exclusion and modification. Normally, every contract for sale in-
cludes a warranty by the seller that he conveys good title 13 and
that the goods are subject to no lien or encumbrance of which
the buyer has no knowledge. 14 If the seller does not claim title
or is known to be selling only such right or interest as he or
another has, he can protect himself from warranty liability by
language sufficient to give buyers reason to know of his position.
The same result will flow from appropriate circumstances. For
example, a sheriff conducting a public sale will not warrant title
in himself; he is selling only such right as a third person may
have." 5
With respect to certain very important goods an effective war-
ranty of title has to be broad enough to protect buyers against
third party claims derived from rights other than straight owner-
ship. In these situations protection against infringement is a proper
incident of a warranty of title. But here we have a form of pro-
tection so broad that protection of innocent sellers is needed."16 If
use is to be protected by law and available only to licensed buyers,
109. § 2-719(3).
110. See § 2-607(5) (a) for the procedure to be followed.
111. Thus, meeting the requirements of § 2-715(2) (a).
112. § 2-106(1).
113. 1 2-312(1) (a).
114. § 2-312(1)(b).
115. § 2-312(2).
116. See 85 U.S.C. J 271(a) (1958).
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protection of the buyer who innocently sells is needed. To limit
the warranty against infringement appropriately, the Code provides
its protection only when the seller is a merchant regularly dealing
in goods of the kind."?
A very important, yet novel, form of warranty protection is
provided sellers when the buyer has control of the facts. If the
buyer furnishes specifications to which the seller must conform,
the buyer must hold the seller harmless against any claim of
infringement or the like that arises out of seller's compliance with
the buyer's specifications." 8
If the buyer is pursued by a claimant who challenges his title
or claims infringement, he, of course, has the same privilege to
vouch in his seller as he would have for another breach," 9 but
he must give timely notice of the suit.120 If the claim is for in-
fringement or the like, his seller may demand in writing that the
buyer give him control of the litigation, including the right to
settle. If the seller makes such a demand and agrees to bear the
expense and satisfy any judgment that may result against the
buyer, the buyer must turn over the control or lose his action
over against his seller.' 2 ' In those cases in which seller is entitled
to be protected by his buyer, the same rules apply. 22 He must
give notice of the litigation within a reasonable time; 2 3 the burden
of establishing breach is his,' 24 but he may summon his buyer to
defend; 1 25 and he must be prepared to surrender control of the
litigation to a willing buyer.12
117. § 2-312(3).
118. Ibid.
119. 2-607 (5) (a).
120. 3 2-607(3)(b).
121. 2-607 (5) (b).
122. 3 2-607(6).
123. 2-607(3) (b).
124. 3 2-607(4).
125. § 2-607 (5) (a).
126. 8 2-607(5)(b).
